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Financial economists have debated the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) for decades.
Most formal tests of the hypothesis have involved econometricians backtesting strategies that seem reasonable. Such tests have drawbacks. First, they presume that the econometrician can condition on all of the information that investors use in making their decisions. As a result, they make it virtually impossible to ever prove that the market is efficient. Second, such tests typically assume that investors have available, at the time of their investments, all the financial, econometric, and computational technology available to the econometrician. As a result, they may document apparent market inefficiencies that investors fail to exploit or even recognize.
1 In this paper, we offer a more powerful test of market efficiency that is not subject to these concerns.
According to the original EMH, investors' risk-adjusted performance should be random: they should neither consistently beat the market nor should they, in the absence of transaction costs, consistently underperform the market. Any evidence that a subset of individual investors exhibit performance persistence is therefore evidence against market efficiency. It suggests that investors are trading on valuable information that we do not see and that we have a difficult time capturing in our models. We test market efficiency by examining whether investors that have performed abnormally well in the past continue to perform abnormally well in the future.
An advantage of studying individual trader performance to learn about overall market efficiency is that such an approach vastly expands the set of strategies being indirectly tested and the set of information on which trades potentially are conditioned. The burden is no longer on the econometrician to identify and measure the information used in constructing trading strategies. In particular, there is no need to run thousands of diverse tests and then speculate how to discount the statistical significance of these tests to adjust for datamining.
At first glance, it would seem a search for evidence that individual traders outperform the market is not very promising. Individual traders are often regarded as at best uninformed, at worst fools. The noise trader approach to securities markets, for example, identifies individual investors as generating demands that are generally driven by liquidity or psychological considerations unrelated to the information about underlying security values (see, e.g., Black (1986 ), De Long et al. (1990 and Lee et al. (1991) ). Several studies have documented the poor average performance of individual traders relative to the market and to institutional traders. Individual traders appear to trade too much, maintain underdiversified portfolios, and hold onto losing positions for too long. This study relates closely to studies of persistence in the performance of mutual funds. Most studies of mutual funds find that their risk-adjusted performance lags that of the overall market.
3 Similarly, only limited evidence exists suggesting that those funds that outperform can be expected to continue to do so in the future. 4 While few would expect individual traders to be, on average, better informed than mutual fund managers, there are compelling reasons to believe that individ-ual traders are better-positioned than mutual funds to exploit a given informational advantage. First, individual traders almost always trade smaller positions than professional traders. As a result, the pressure that their trades impart on prices is likely to be much less. This makes them far better positioned to trade using strategies that exploit smaller, shorter-term information and deviations from fundamental values. A second advantage that individual traders have relative to mutual funds is that individuals are less constrained to hold a diversified portfolio or to track the market or a given benchmark. Finally, from the standpoint of being able to detect performance persistence, the transaction-level datasets of individual accounts are far superior to mutual fund data, which is generally available only at a quarterly frequency. If the performance of a stock the week after it is traded offers a clear picture of the ability of the individual placing the trade, as we argue below, tests that rely on transactions reported at a quarterly frequency are considerably disadvantaged.
Using the transaction record of over 110,000 accounts at a major discount brokerage, we conduct a variety of tests of individual performance persistence. First, to examine whether traders exhibit statistically significant persistence in their performance, we divide the sample in half and examine the correlation in the risk-adjusted performance of an account's trades between the two halves. The performance of an individual's trades is measured as the average return over the subsequent week. To ensure that our results are not driven by any price pressure created by the trade, we always wait a day before beginning our measurement of returns. We also calculate the sample probability that the average return earned by the account over the sample half is positive.
There is some debate as to the proper way to adjust for risk. It is common to use as benchmarks the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1992) , or to control for characteristics such as book/market, size, or momentum. The problem is that each of these characteristics can be a proxy for market mispricing, as can the factor loadings in factors that are generated by portfolios based upon these characteristics. Thus, such benchmarks can absorb some of the abnormal performance that the test is trying to measure; (see, e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2000) , Daniel et al. (2001) ). We use as our benchmark the Fama French (1992) 3-Factor Model and the Daniel et al. (1997) characteristic-based adjustment. The reader who regards these as models of risk can regard this as a fair test for abnormal performance of investors. The reader who regards these benchmarks as capturing mispricing may regard our tests as showing the ability of individual investors to earn superior profits above and beyond any gains or losses they earn based upon other well-known effects such as value, size and momentum.
We find that trader performance, whether measured as an average risk-adjusted return or as a sample probability, is consistently correlated across the two sample halves at around 10 percent with high significance. The positive correlation survives a variety of robustness checks, including comparing even and odd quarters, removing the smallest one-third of the sample of CRSP stocks, and removing all stocks in which the account has traded more than once -i.e. is potentially an insider. To see whether the persistence is due to trader ability (or negative ability) to time the market, we recompute our tests replacing individual stock returns with overall market returns. In this way, we can test whether individuals consistently sell individual stocks before the market drops and purchase before the market rises. When individual stock returns are replaced with the overall market return in this way, we find some limited evidence that accounts have persistence in their ability to time the market.
Next, to examine economic significance of performance persistence, we classify each trade of each account according to the performance of all other trades placed by that account. In this way, we maximize our precision in classifying an account. We call this a complementary image procedure, in analogy to the phenomenon in visual perception in which a figure is identified through its contrast with a complementary background. Although this procedure typically uses ex-post information, and therefore does not represent a feasible trading strategy, it does not use the returns of the trade itself in the classification stage. Each trade is then sorted according to the sample probability that all other trades by that account have a positive average return.
We then form decile portfolios and calculate the average of the returns earned on each trade during the subsequent week.
The difference between the returns of the top and bottom portfolios is striking.
Trades in the top decile earn risk-adjusted returns between 12 and 15 basis points per day during the following week. Trades in the bottom decile lose between 11 and 12 basis points per day. The results are highly statistically significant and are invariant to using a factor-or characteristic-based risk adjustment. The results are also robust to removing the smallest third of CRSP stocks and removing trades in stocks traded more than once by the account. This suggests that the top traders earn economically large returns for the information they have in a wide range of companies.
Finally, to investigate whether the information contained in account trading behavior offers profitable trading opportunities to those with access, we construct and test the following strategy. On each date, we rank all traders who have traded at least 25 times up to that point. We rank them according to the sample probability that their average return is positive. Next, for each quintile of traders, we construct a value-weighted portfolio consisting of all stocks purchased by traders in that quintile during the previous week. We then construct a zero-cost trading strategy that is long the portfolio of the top quintile and short the portfolio of the bottom quintile. The returns of this strategy are then risk-adjusted using factor and characteristic-based adjustments.
Using the one-week holding period, this strategy earns risk-adjusted returns of 5 basis points per day, or 13.7 percent per annum. Again, the results are robust to removing small stocks and trades in stocks an account has traded previously. The strategy is also assessed using a one-day and a one-month holding period. Using the one-day holding period, the return is 7 basis points per day, while the daily return of one-month holding period is indistinguishable from zero.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we describe the data. Section II reports the results of the across-sample correlation tests and the estimation of returns of trades of accounts ranked according to the performance of their other trades. Section II also discusses the results of a trading strategy designed to exploit information contained in the trades of well-and poorly-performing accounts. Section III provides some interpretation of our evidence and Section IV concludes.
I. Data
This paper studies a dataset provided by a large discount brokerage firm on the trades placed by 115,856 accounts from January 1990 through November 1996. For the subset of purchases that were later (at least partially) sold in our sample period, the holding period for the average (median) account was 378.11 (293) days.
The lower panel of Table 1 The key challenge we face in this inquiry is that we only have six years of data.
This severely limits our power to assess the ability of many of the individuals in our dataset. To counter this problem, we take a number of steps. First, we focus solely on account trades and ignore account holdings. While this eliminates any possibility of assessing the ability of individuals who rarely trade, it makes our inference problem considerably easier. The difficulty of inferring ability from holdings data during such a short time period is that many factors may lead individuals to maintain positions in stocks that they no longer expect to outperform the market, including transaction costs, capital gains overhang, etc. Moreover, to the extent that an individual's information advantage is short-lived, the unexpected return on a trade will account for an increasing fraction of total returns as the holding period grows. Thus, any inference of expected returns from realized returns is likely to be considerably easier when the focus is on shorter horizons, which the transactions data allow. With this in mind, we typically focus on the returns individuals obtain from their trades during the week that follows their trades, though in Section 4 we consider shorter and longer horizons.
An additional step we take to mitigate our inference problem is that, for most of our tests, we restrict our attention to accounts that have traded at least 25 times. While this removes more than 99,000 accounts from our consideration, it ensures that for each account we study we have sufficient data to estimate their returns with some accuracy.
For the factor-based risk adjustment, we estimate time-series regressions of the return on each stock net of the Treasury-bill rate on several factors: the CRSP valueweighted market minus the Treasury-bill rate, a size factor, a book-to-market factor, and one lag of each of these factors to adjust for the possibility of non-trading biases.
For each month, we estimate these regressions using daily data for the calendar year finishing at the end of the month. We take the risk-adjusted return of each stock during the month in question to be the sum of the intercept in these regressions plus the error term, or equivalently, the realized return minus the sum of the factor loadings times the realized value of each of the factors. Both the size and the bookto-market factors are calculated by taking the equal weighted average of the top three value-weighted size and book-to-market decile portfolio returns and subtracting the average of the bottom three decile portfolio returns.
For the characteristic-based risk adjustment, we rank each stock into quintiles based on its market capitalization at the end of the previous month, its book-tomarket ratio based on its most recently announced book equity value (lagged by at least 60 days to ensure public availability) and its momentum status. To determine the momentum status of each stock, we sort stocks each month into deciles based on their return over the previous three months. Any stock that has been in the highest decile during one of the past three months is considered a winner stock, while any stock that has been in the lowest decile is considered a loser stock. A stock that was in the loser group during the last month and the winner group in the previous month is considered a loser. Stocks that are neither losers nor winners are designated as neither, resulting in three possible momentum categories. Combining these three momentum categories with five size and five book-to-market categories results in seventy-five possible classifications for each stock. We calculate daily equalweighted average returns for each of these seventy-five stock classifications, taking the characteristic-adjusted return of a particular stock to be its realized return minus the average return to a stock with its classification.
Our tests for stock selection ability focus solely on the performance of trades that initiate or expand existing positions in companies. We ignore all sales of shares. Our rationale for this is that we expect that sales are often not strongly driven by private information or analysis. Liquidity needs, or the reversing of a position taken long ago in order to diversify may motivate many sales. Such sales may also be motivated by a desire to move into a company expected to outperform the market. Since few accounts place short-sale trades, we ignore them as well. In contrast, we regard the purchase of a particular stock (as contrasted with the alternative of investing in a mutual fund) as a relatively clear indication that the investor expects that stock to outperform the market.
Using the risk-adjusted return series, we then calculate the average daily returns earned during the days that immediately follow a given purchase. Specifically, if an account purchases shares in a company on a particular date, for our tests that use a weekly horizon, we calculate the average daily return in that company during the next five trading days. Returns calculated using a one-day horizon use only the subsequent trading day's return, whereas those using a one-month horizon use the subsequent 20 trading days' returns. Although it is likely the case that the account earns additional returns in the company on the day it is purchased, we do not include the trading day's return in our calculations. This is done to ensure that any price pressure created by the purchase -particularly of small companies -does not distort our results.
II. Results

A. Return Correlations
We test for persistence in account performance in several ways. We begin with a simple correlation test in which average account returns are compared across the two sample halves. To be considered in our calculations, we require accounts to have traded at least 25 times during the first half of our sample. The six year sample is split in half at the end of the fourth year to ensure that roughly an equivalent number of accounts have traded at least 25 times in both sample halves. To make sure our results are not contaminated by, for example, individuals who trade more frequently if their performance is good, we place no minimum trade restriction on the second half of the sample. We then compare the correlation in mean risk-adjusted returns across the two sample halves.
We calculate correlations of raw and risk-adjusted returns. Risks are adjusted using the Fama and French (1992) 3-Factor Model and using DGTW characteristic portfolios. To account for the fact that average returns are calculated with varying precisions across accounts (and across sample halves), we calculate two additional return correlations. The first compares the ratio of the mean return to the return's standard deviation across the two sample halves. For the second, we compute the sample probability of the t-statistic of the hypothesis that a given account's riskadjusted return is positive during the sample half. We then calculate the correlation in the account sample probability across the two sample halves. Finally, as a robustness check, we also calculate the correlation in returns obtained in even and odd quarters.
The results for the three return correlations are reported in the first three panels of As we can see, the correlation in performance across the sample is consistently around 10 percent and highly statistically significant. The results are significant for both correlation calculations and are largely invariant to whether or how we adjust for risk. The correlations are also consistently positive and significant for each of our three performance measures: the simple average returns, the return-risk ratios, and the sample probabilities. The correlations are also robust to splitting the sample into even and odd quarters instead of halves. Thus, the results of Table 2 provide the first evidence of persistence in the performance of individual traders.
Lastly, to see whether the persistence is due to trader ability (or negative ability)
to time the market, we recompute our tests replacing individual stock returns with overall value-weighted market returns. In this way, we can test whether individuals consistently purchase stocks before the market rises. When individual stock returns are replaced with the overall market return, most of the evidence of performance persistence disappears. However, the sample probability correlations retain most of its significance, suggesting perhaps some persistence in market timing. Overall, though, it appears that most of the persistence in the performance of individual traders' trades come primarily from stock selection and not market timing. Since we only have six years of data, and since many traders have not accumulated a sufficient number of trades to be accurately classified until fairly late in the sample, we employ what we call a complementary image procedure to maximize our power to identify able traders. In this procedure, for each trade placed by a given trader, we use all other trades he has placed in our dataset to calculate his average return and the sample probability that this average return is positive. That is, to maximize the accuracy of our classification of the trader, we use both trades placed in the future as well as those in placed in the past in assessing a trader's ability at a given point in time.
B. Performance Classification of Traders
Clearly, this does not represent an implementable trading strategy. We make no claim that someone who observed the individual trades as they were occurring could have used this procedure to make profits. However, the purpose of this procedure is not to design a strategy for making money, but to address the scientific question of whether smart traders are able to earn unusually high profits. This procedure maximizes our power to identify who is or is not a skillful trader. We emphasize that although we are using ex post data to identify who is a skillful trader, it does not do so in a way that biases the measurement of traders' profits. In predicting the profit from a given week, this procedure scrupulously purges the profit outcome for that week from the set of data used to identify the set of smart traders. In contrast, in order to test whether there is a profitable trading strategy based upon mimicking individual investor trades, later we will also consider a rolling forward procedure.
So, corresponding to each trade of a given trader, we have the average return of all other trades placed by this trader, and a sample probability that this average return is positive. We then sort all trades according to the corresponding average returns and sample probabilities, form deciles, and calculate the average returns of the trades within each decile. We write the average return of trader j in all trades except trade
where n j is the number of trades placed by trader j and r j,l is the excess return earned by trader j on trade l during the subsequent five trading days. Using this, the average return of the trades in decile i can be expressed as
where r j,k is the excess return earned by trader j on trade k and I ³r k j ∈ [r i , r i ]´is an indicator variable which is one ifr k j is within the limits of decile i, r i and r i . Table 3 reports the average returns of the trades in each decile.
The first column of Table 3 reports the average excess return to each decile. As we can see, the portfolios differ markedly in terms of average excess returns. Trades placed by accounts whose other trades average returns that are among the bottom 10 percent of all trades lose 4.9 basis points per day during the next five trading days.
In contrast, trades placed by accounts ranking in the top decile earn 19.4 basis points per day. When these returns are risk-adjusted the picture remains the same. Using the factor-based risk-adjustment, the trades of accounts in the bottom decile lose 12 basis points per day, whereas those of accounts in the top decile earn 15 basis points per day. Both figures are significantly different from zero and their difference, 27.5 basis points, is highly significant. The characteristic-based adjustment results in a slightly lower spread of 22.8 basis points, but one that is still highly statistically and economically significant.
Although the portfolios are constructed using ex-post data, the return differentials are nonetheless striking considering that the EMH would suggest, under fairly general conditions, that the risk-adjusted returns on an account's trades are independent draws. We have either not properly adjusted for risk, we have measured returns in a way that introduces some correlation, or the accounts have significant dispersion in their alphas. One possibility is that our restriction that accounts must have traded at least 25 times is introducing bias. For example, it could be the case that accounts that have either done well in the past trade more frequently because they believe they have ability.
5 Similarly, accounts that have done poorly in the past may be more inclined to trade aggressively to make up for past losses. 6 To investigate this, our sixth column sorts all trades of all accounts according to the average return earned on the account's other trades, adjusted for risk using the 3-factor model. Although this classification is far less precise, and results in the extreme portfolios having a bias towards accounts that trade infrequently, it produces an average return dispersion that is consistent with the previous findings. In particular, accounts in the bottom decile place trades that lose 8.8 basis points per day, whereas accounts in the top decile earn 11 basis points per day during the week following their trades.
A second possibility is that frequent account trading in the same stock generates a correlation in trade returns. To control for this possibility, we reclassify accounts using only trades made in stocks they trade once during our sample. These results are reported in the final column of Table 3 . Although the statistical significance declines somewhat (due to the fact that we have 40 percent fewer observations), the overall result is unchanged. Although traders in the bottom decile no longer perform so poorly in subsequent trades, traders in the top decile continue to place trades that earn nearly 10 basis points per day. The spread between the top and bottom deciles, at 12.7 basis point per day, remains highly significant. An important implication of this is that our results are not likely to be due to traders trading on inside information. While it is possible that a subset of the accounts have inside information about a company or two (i.e. in their employer or friend's firm), it seems highly doubtful that a large number of accounts have access to inside information in a broad set of companies. Finally, to see whether the results are concentrated in small, illiquid stocks, we rerun our classification using only the largest two-thirds of all CRSP firms. Once again, the results (not reported here) remain the same.
C. A Feasible Investment Strategy
The results thus far demonstrate fairly conclusively that a subset of our traders have ability of some sort. However, it is not yet clear whether these results offer a trading strategy for an observer to exploit the information contained in the accounts' trades. To investigate the real-time returns offered by individual trade information, we construct zero-cost portfolios that go long all the trades of accounts that have performed well up to the current date and go short all the trades of accounts that have performed poorly up to the current date. As with our earlier tests, to ensure that any price pressure created by trades does not influence our results, we wait until the day after the trade is executed to begin measuring returns.
One difficulty with this approach is that since we only have six years of data, and much of this is used to assess traders' performance, our power to detect abnormal returns is somewhat limited. To maximize our power to detect abnormal performance, we face a tradeoff. On one hand, we can only include trades of accounts with returns significantly different from zero, improving our precision by focusing only on trades of accounts that have been accurately classified. The weakness of this approach from the standpoint of precision is that, to the extent that, at times, only a limited number of accounts can be classified as unusually good (or bad), our portfolio will be highly undiversified. When we only have one thousand days over which to measure our strategy's expected return, this lack of diversification can result in the unexpected component of returns becoming so large that inference is impossible. On the other hand, if we are more generous in terms of the accounts that we include in the strategy, our diversification improves but a larger fraction of the trades we mimic are from accounts that have alphas that are not different from zero.
Thus, to strike a balance, we only consider accounts that have traded at least 25 times up to the current date, but we sort them into quintile portfolios to ensure that our portfolio is diversified. Furthermore, we only measure the returns to our strategy on days when there are at least 25 stocks in the top and bottom portfolios.
Specifically, we rank all accounts that have traded at least 25 times up to the current date by the sample probability that their risk-adjusted return is positive. We then compute value-weighted returns of all the stocks purchased during the last five days by all accounts in each of the performance quintiles. Specifically, the return to portfolio i on date t is calculated as follows:
where MV j is the market value of firm j on date t, r j,t is the return to firm j on date t, and I i,j,t is an indicator variable which is one if an account in portfolio i has purchased firm j within the holding period preceding date t and zero otherwise.
Using the strategy return defined in equation (3), we calculate the risk-adjusted return to the strategy that goes long the top quintile and short the bottom quintile.
We use a 4-factor model to adjust returns for risk, adding a momentum factor to the Fama French (1992) 3-factor model. 7 When we employ the 4-factor model, we calculate a raw return in equation (3) and then regress the difference between the top and bottom portfolio daily return on the four factors. When we risk-adjust using the characteristic-based adjustment, equation (3) is calculated using the individual firm characteristic-adjusted returns. The reported results focus on the 4-factor risk adjustment though highly similar results are obtained using the characteristic-based adjustment. To ensure that trading in small, illiquid firms does not drive the results, we remove the smallest third of all CRSP firms from the sample. Finally, we examine the returns to the trading strategy using three portfolio formation horizons: daily, weekly, and monthly. The results are reported in Table 4 .
Beginning with the one-week holding period, the strategy generates risk-adjusted returns of 5.1 basis points per day. When only a market factor is used to riskadjust, the returns are 4.4 basis points per day. Both figures are significant at the 5 percent level but not the 1 percent level. If we measure returns at the daily horizon -that is, on the trading day following the trade placement -the results are slightly stronger in economic and statistical terms. The 4-factor risk-adjusted returns are 6.8 basis points per day and those adjusted using the market factor are 5.6 basis points per day. When we move to the one-month horizon, however, the results essentially disappear, falling below a basis point per day and losing any statistical significance.
The disappearance of significance at the monthly horizon suggests that the ability of traders to select stocks that earn abnormal returns may be confined to fairly short horizons. Alternatively, it may simply illustrate how difficult inference becomes at longer horizons, as the unexpected component of returns begins to dominate return realizations.
As described above, estimating the returns to a feasible trading strategy based on our data involves a delicate balance. If we base our strategy on fewer traders with more extreme past performance, the variability of our results increases. If we base our strategy on more traders in an effort to reduce the variability of our results, the average performance of the strategy declines. In the tests reported in Table 4, we form top and bottom trader mimicking portfolios based on the top and bottom quintiles of all ranked traders. We require all ranked traders to have at least 25 previous trades and we require both the top and bottom trader mimicking portfolios to consist of at least 25 stocks on any particular day. For the returns calculated over one week, our requirements mean that out of 1,205 possible trading days, we can only evaluate the returns to our strategy on 1,072 days. If we define the top and bottom trader mimicking portfolios by taking the top and bottom deciles of ranked traders, the strategy return can only be estimated on 945 days. Using the top and bottom deciles, the one week intercepts become 4.4 (t = 1.74) basis points for the 4-factor model and 5.1 basis points (t = 2.14) for the market model. If we define the top and bottom portfolios as the top and bottom thirty percent of traders, the number of valid return days becomes 1,101. The intercepts become 3.8 basis points (t = 2.40) for the 4-factor model and 3.1 basis points (t = 2.05) for the market model. If we estimate the regressions reported in Table 4 with a weighted least squares technique that assigns weights to each observation that are proportional to the square root of the number of stocks in the top and bottom portfolios, the significance of the intercepts improves markedly. We do not report our weighted least squares results because they do not correspond to a simple feasible trading strategy.
III. Discussion
The above results raise a number of interesting questions. To begin, why are the results so much stronger, both economically and statistically, when portfolios are formed using all available trade data? Do the additional datapoints really add that much power? It turns out they do. Their contribution is twofold. First, the additional data gives us far more information with which to classify traders. With the real time trading strategy, a trader can be classified using only data up to the point in time of a given trade. Thus, the accuracy with which a trader is classified improves steadily across time. Conversely, when all data are used, each trade can be classified as if it is the last. This not only allows us to rank each trade far more accurately. It also allows us to use more trades of more traders. For instance, using our minimum of 25 trades, a trader who has placed 27 trades will only have two trades considered for our real time strategy's portfolio. On the other hand, when ex-post data are used in classifying trades, all 27 can count towards portfolio return calculations.
A second question raised by the results is whether they truly offer the opportunity for essentially riskless trading profits to anyone with access to the account trade data.
With only six years of data, the answer is no. While there appears to be a five basis point spread in the real time daily returns of the top and bottom quintiles, considering that the positions are turned over every five trading days, transaction costs will dominate any excess returns earned by the strategy. Unfortunately, this is likely to be the case even though the five basis point spread is generated without trading in the smallest third of all CRSP firms. On the other hand, if one has access to more than six years of data, because of the high precision with which account performance can be classified, the risk-adjusted return spread from year six onward is likely to resemble those calculated in Table 3 . Unless round trip trading costs exceed one percent, it is likely that the risk-adjusted returns will remain significantly positive.
A final question is whether these returns are generated by trading on inside information. While it would be surprising if small accounts at a discount brokerage had access to inside information, it is possible that a subset of the accounts have access to important information about their employer or that of a spouse or friend. However, given that our results are not significantly altered when we remove all trades placed by a given account multiple times in the same company, it suggests this is not the case. Moreover, since our results are also unchanged when we remove the smallest third of the sample of companies, it seems highly doubtful that a large number of accounts have access to inside information in a broad set of medium and large cap companies.
IV. Conclusion
Although individual investors have been much maligned in the finance literature in recent years, the results of this paper demonstrate that not all individual investors are so dumb. Traders that can be classified among the top 10 percent place trades that earn risk-adjusted returns of up to 15 basis points per day during the following week. These returns are invariant to how one adjusts for risk, to the removal of small stocks from the sample, and to the removal of any companies in which the account has traded more than once. On the other hand, individual investors that consistently place underperforming trades also exist. Traders classified among the bottom 10 percent of all traders place trades that can expect to lose up to 12 basis points per day during the subsequent week.
Our findings cast some doubt on the notion that individual traders irrationally trade too much. If traders vary widely in terms of their ability to select investments, and if they learn about and develop this ability through trading, trading at a frequency that might appear otherwise costly or excessive may in fact be rational. Moreover, to the extent that traders who learn that they have unusual ability move their accounts to a lower-cost trading platform, such learning may be difficult to detect in the data.
Of course, this will work to mitigate the returns obtained from mimicking the trades of those that remain in the sample.
Finally, this evidence does not support the efficient market hypothesis. At a minimum, the ability of small traders at a discount brokerage to select outperforming companies runs in direct violation of strong form market efficiency. Moreover, since this ability is not confined to small firms or only a few firms in which the traders transact frequently, it suggests that they are not merely trading on inside information.
Their broad ability to select outperforming companies implies a violation of semistrong form market efficiency. An important remaining question is whether the large brokerage companies are aware of the value of the information contained in their customers' trades. Table 2 reports correlations between the returns on firms purchased by a given account during the five trading days that follow the purchase. The correlations of sample halves split the sample in half at the end of the fourth year and calculate the correlation in performance across the two sample halves. Only accounts with at least 25 trades during the first four years are included in the calculations. The even/odd quarter correlations divide all trades into those that occur during the first and third quarter of the year and those that occur during the second and fourth. Only accounts with at least 25 trades in odd quarters are considered in the calculations. The sample probabilities are calculated using a t-distribution and a t-score that average returns are positive. The 3-factor risk-adjusted return correlations regress returns on daily realizations of the SMB, HML and RMRF factors. The DGTW characteristicadjusted returns subtract from a given firm's daily return the daily return to the equivalent size, book-to-market, and momentum portfolio. The market-timing returns replace the daily risk-adjusted return of a given firm with the corresponding daily return of the value-weighted market portfolio. P-values are in parentheses. Table 3 reports the average daily return of trades that have been sorted into deciles according to the assessed ability of the trader. Returns are calculated by averaging the returns of the firm over the five days after it was purchased. The first four columns of numbers are for portfolios that have been formed according to the probability that the trader's other trades have a positive average return. These portfolios only include trades of traders that have placed at least 25 trades. The excess return column reports the average daily return in excess of the risk-free rate for each portfolio. The next column reports the standard deviation of this excess return. The next two columns report 3-factor risk-adjusted and DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns. The final two columns report 3-factor risk-adjusted returns for portfolios formed using two alternative sorting procedures. In the second-last column, stocks are sorted according to the raw returns earned by that trader in his other trades, regardless of how few trades the trader has placed. In the final column, only stocks that have been traded once by a given account are included in the calculation of probabilities and returns. T-statistics are in parentheses. Table 4 reports the results of a regression of a trading strategy's return on the daily realizations (and lagged realizations) of four factors: the market return minus the risk-free rate (RMRF), the return of high minus low book-to-market stocks (HML), the return of small minus large stocks (SMB), and the return of a momentum portfolio that is long past winners and short past losers (MOM). Portfolios are constructed by sorting on each date accounts that have traded at least 25 times up to that date based on the performance of their past trades. Only the largest two-thirds of all CRSP stocks are included in portfolios. For the three holding periods, returns are measured using the first trading day (One Day), first five trading days (One Week), and first twenty trading days (One Month) after the trade is placed. The returns are then value-weighted within each portfolio. The strategy's returns are constructed by going long the top quintile and short the bottom quintile on days when at least 25 stocks are in each quintile. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
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